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2
COMPETITION WITHIN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIMES: THE INSTANCE OF
PATENT RIGHTS
Rudolph] R Peritz

Introduction
This chapter describes an emergent jurisprudence and a residual economics that
converge to support the reconceptualization of US patent policy as a competitioq
regime. Its approach is inspired by an opinion that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court some 20 years ago. The Court's recent patent
jurisprudence sounds an echo of the opinion, which described the foundation of
patent policy this way-' ... [F] ree exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception.' There is, Justice O 'Connor explained,
a '. . . baseline of free competition upon which the patent system's incentive to
creative effort depends.'
The chapter develops this proposition in three sections. The first explicates the economics of incentive theory, both its limits and its residual value. The second analyses
the jurisprudence of recent decisions by the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals- the speciality court for patent and trademark. The third section
presents some instances of progressive change that would come of extending the
reconception of the patent system as fundamentally a competition regime, an extension inspired by Justice O'Connor's image but informed by the failure of incentive
theory as the economic logic for patent protection.
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A. Crisis, Stalemate, and Progress
Intellectual property1 protection and free competition have long been viewed as
alternative means to encourage inventive activity and, through it, promote progress
in the form of economic growth. Their relationship as means has sometimes been
characterized as conflicting and other times as congruent. The same can be said about
the progress they are intended to promote. In the United States, mainstream policy
cabins these tensions of means and ends by treating IP protection as a domain of
exclusionary rights and by removing free competition to a separate domain, to the
domain of antitrust. With this bifurcation, the problem has been largely transformed
into a question of adjudicating the relationship between two separate bodies of
public policy.
Nonetheless, some competition doctrines linger within the IP realm. These doctrines, such as patent misuse and copyright fair use, have been characterized as
intruders in the domain of exclusionary rights. Patent misuse is labelled an historical
anomaly that properly belongs in antitrust, if anywhere at all, while copyright fair use
is described as an interloper-either an alien article of political faith in First
Amendment Speech Rights or a commercial artefact of market failures that temporarily limit the author's fundamental right to exclude. 2 Since the 1980s, IP policy
makers have settled the problem of malingering doctrine by favouring exclusionary
rights over free competition and by propertizing and otherwise extending IP rights.
This dynamic of bifurcation, preference, and expansion rests on the asserted superiority of exclusionary rights over open access in encouraging invention, a superiority
that derives from reliance on an IP economics that holds neither in theory nor in
practice.
There has long been trouble brewing in the IP economics that prevails in the United
States. The trouble with IP economics recently reached boiling point with an admission by William Landes and Richard Posner, the Chicago School's dynamic duo of
law and economics, that there is no ground for the dominant view ofIP economics,
no ground for the view that incentive theory can justify, explain, or rationalize
IP rights. They made this confession in their book entitled 7he Economic Structure of

1 Unless otherwise specified, intellectual property refers only to the rights granted under patent and
copyright statutes enacted by Congress in accord with the Constirurion's call to promote progress,
though the term can plausibly be understood as referring as well to trade secret and trademark protecrion insofar as they have been increasingly justified in similar instrumentalist terms. The distinction is
made in this chapter because rhe analysis of the patent domain takes account of Constiturional
origin.
2 See eg, DJ Gifford, 'Antitrust's Troubled Relations with Intellectual Property' (2003) 87
Minnesota L Rev 1695 (parent); WJ Gordon, 'Fair Use as Market Failure: A Srrucrural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax case and its Predecessors' (1982) 82 Columbia L Rev 1600 (copyright).
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IP Law. 3 The book has received wide attention and much praise. But the public
confession of incentive theory's failure has been largely ignored.
At virtually the same moment, a related but separate development was bubbling to
the surface of IP jurisprudence-in a recent series of surprising opinions, the US
Supreme Court weakened patent protection and in the process expanded the role of
free competition as an internal engine for promoting economic progress. The opinions were surprising because they run against the dominant view that pits an IP
domain of exclusionary rights against an exogenous antitrust domain of free access.
The recent opinions have destabilized this binary opposition berween IP rights and
free competition. 4
In tandem, the failed economics and unstable jurisprudence have thrown the dominant approach to IP rights into crisis. The crisis is an emergent form of a long-term
problem at the heart of both the economics and the jurisprudence, and it cannot be
easily resolved.
On the economics side, informed policy makers have long recognized that economic
progress is driven by the rwin engines of IP monopoly and free competition. As
economist Kenneth Arrow wrote in his landmark 1962 paper, the great difficulty lies
in determining an optimal balance berween them. Economist Joseph Schumpeter
had earlier sought to merge the rwo engines in his vision of competition as serial
monopoly, his perennial gale of creative destruction. 5

As for the jurisprudence, the US Constitution presents a corresponding legal
challenge to balance the exclusionary rights ofIP protection and the open access of
3 WM Landes and RA Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectttal Property Law (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003).
4
This chapter cakes up patent law as a competition regime, a theme chat with respect co copyright,
trade secret, and trademark as well is explored in my earlier writing, beginning with Report to the IP
Academy of Singapore (2002-2003) (revised and published sub nom 'Competition Policy and its
Implications for lntellecrual Property Rights in the United Scates' in SD Anderman (ed) The Interface
Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) and variously
investigated in other writing). The theme is a special case of the complex relationship between property rights and competition policy in American political economy, which I firsr developed in the
domain of antitrust; see, eg, 'A Counter-History ofAntirrusr Law' in Symposium: The Frontiers ofLegal
Thought [1990) Duke LJ 263; 'The "Rule of Reason" in Antirrusr Law: Property Logic in Restraint of
Competition'(l989) 40 Hastings LJ 285, excerpted in ET Sullivan (ed) The Political Economy ofthe
Sherman Act: The First Hundred Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 116, reprinted in
R Graves (ed) Competitidn Law (Burlington: Dartmouth Publishing Co, 2003), reprinted in
Competition Law (London: Ashgare Publishing, 2004). The theme was extended ro orher domains
in Competition Policy in America: History, Rhetoric, Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996 rev
edn 2001). This chapter on parent policy is parr of a larger project, whose working ride is The Political

Economy ofProgress: IP Rights and Competition.
5 J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1942, 3rd edn
1950); KJ Arrow, 'Economic Welfare and rhe Allocation of Resources for Invention' in R Nelson (ed)
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princeron: Princeton
University Press, 1962) 609. Ir should be nored char Arrow wrote about invention while Schumperer
emphasized innovation-that is, the commercialization of invention.
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free competition. 6 The Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright and patent protection for the explicit purpose of promoting' . .. the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.' So copyright and patent are not rewards, not natural rights. They are
incentives-private means to a public end. But when does the private incentive of
properry protection promote the public benefits of progress? In both economic
and jurisprudential terms, when does such protection produce more progress than
would otherwise accrue with free competition? The answer to this question has
proved elusive to both theorists and empirical researchers. 7
Despite this indeterminacy, mainstream IP economics still rests on incentive theory,
which holds that the scale and scope ofIP rights should be determined by the degree
to which they promote economic progress. Incentive theory's incapaciry to guide
such determinations results in an analytical stalemate between the exclusionary
rights of IP protection and the open access of free competition, a stalemate because
both produce economic growth but to indeterminable degrees. In this light, neither
alternative deserves prioriry as the better means to promote economic progress.
This stalemate, this open question at the very core ofIP policy, has put analysts and
decision makers, including federal judges, between a rock and a hard place-on the
one side, policy makers are pressed to make decisions; on the other, they are blocked
from making reasoned decisions because there is no analytical methodology at hand.
Policy makers have sought to extricate themselves from this predicament by taking a
fall-back position, the position that maximizing the means maximizes the ends, that
greater IP protection naturally leads to more invention and thus to more progress. In
my view, this fall-back position explains the so-called propertization ofIP rights, the
normative shift to a Lockean entitlement from an instrumentalist (or means-ends)
evaluation.
This fall-back into natural rights is not surprising, given the powerful ideology of
private properry rights in the United States. But it makes no logical sense. Nor is it
supported in theory or fact. Indeed, it is well-known that too much IP protection as
well as too little can stifle invention and impede economic progress. So both the
economics and the law present IP policy makers with a Goldilocks problem. But
there is no calculus for determining what amount ofIP rights is 'just right,' particularly in a unitary system that does not discriminate among different kinds of inventions. And, of course, there is the other side of the indeterminacy coin; economic
justification is equally lacking for simply eliminating IP rights entirely as a means for
encouraging invention and thus promoting economic progress.
6 United States Constitution, Art. I. Sec. 8, cl 8 states: 'Congress shall have Power: .. . To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arcs, by securing for limired Times ro Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right ro their respective Writings and Discoveries.'
7 For close analysis of these issues, see my essay 'Thinking about Economic Progress: Arrow and
Schumpeter in Time and Space' in J Drexl {ed) Liber Amicorum:for Hanm Ullrich (Bruxelles: Larder
Pub, 2009).
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So, what's to be done? In my view, the answer is dear-change the fall-back position.
Reverse the presumption. When confronted with jurisprudential or economic indeterminacy, adopt the presumption that free competition better promotes the progress called for by constitutional directive. Given the indeterminate economic value
of both free competition and IP rights in encouraging invention, policy analysis
should begin with the presumption of free competition. In choosing between
two rules or standards, policy makers should adopt the one that better expresses the
policy of free competition.
Why adopt the presumption of free competition? In economic terms, because
competition produces a tie-breaker for its indeterminacy stalemate with IP rights.
The tie-breaker is competition's superior distributional outcome. When patents and
other IP rights produce monopoly prices, they create welfare losses in both static and
dynamic terms. In the short run, consumers pay higher prices or go to second best
substitutes. In the longer run, subsequent inventors also pay higher prices or turn to
second best substitutes, causing some combination of decline and path-diversion in
follow-on inventive activity. 8 In this light, a rule or policy that would strengthen IP
rights should first be shown to promote greater progress than would otherwise
occur.

B. Patent Economics: Incentive Gap, Stalemate,
Presumption of Free Competition
This part begins by examining the state of mainstream IP economics in the United
States, particularly the failure of incentive theory as the economic justification for IP
protection, and proceeds by sketching the IP economics that remains viable. The
section closes with discussion of the IP economics of competition.
Incentive theory and its critiques

In the United States, the current economics ofprogress has adopted a mythical origin
not unlike chat ofAthena, the Greek goddess ofwisdom and culture who sprang fully
formed from the head of Zeus. Like Athena, the economic logic of progress is seen as
springing fully formed from the divine thinking of Kenneth Arrow, whose eminence
was established even before his award in 1972 of a Nobel Prize in Economics. His
eminence stems from his canonical 1962 paper entitled Economic Welfare and the
Allocation ofResourcesfor Invention. 9

8 The dynamic effects are a decrease in inventor welfare that results from rhe increased cost of new
information or rhe denial ofaccess at any price. See Peritz 'Freedom to Experiment: Toward a Concept
oflnventor Welfare' (n 67 below}.
9 Arrow (n 5 above).
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Of course despite such mythology, there is a substantial pre-history that posed fundamental questions and deep criticism of IP protection, much of it still pertinent
today. Virtually all the questions emerged in the widespread European debates of the
19th century over patent protection; many of the criticisms were sharpened in the
trenchant analysis ofSir Arnold Plant in his 1934 article entitled The Economic Theory
Concerning Patents for Inventions10 and in a companion piece on copyright. Plant
raised many of the searching questions later addressed by American economists. The
most difficult question concerned the opportunity cost of invention. Plant asked,
when is use of society's resources to invent ' ... superior to alternative uses from
which they are diverted[?] '
The opportunity cost of invention opens a wide gap in the incentive logic of IP
rights, a gap between the private value and the public benefits ofIP rights. There is
little doubt that IP rights create a private incentive to invent-indeed, few could
afford simply to give time to the enterprise of invention without remuneration. Yet
the private value ofIP rights has no necessary logical or economic relationship with
their public benefits, benefits that depend on a wide array of factors. The opportunity
cost of invention is but one powerful admonition to take account of what can be
called the Incentive Gap. Ignoring it produces the category error of equating IP
rights' private value with their public benefits. Taking the Incentive Gap into account
transforms the question into an empirical inquiry.
None of this had noticeable impact in the United States before economist Fritz
Machlup authored his 1958 Report to Congress, entitledAn Economic Review ofthe
Patent System. His was the most influential of 15 reports commissioned by a Congress
concerned whether the costs of the patent system were justified. Here is Machlup's
summary of the economic literature:
None of che empirical evidence ac our disposal and none of che cheorecical arguments
presented either confirms or confutes the belief that the patent system has promoted
che progress of the technical arts and the productivity of che economy. 11

10 A Plant, Selected Economic Essays and Addresses (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1974 reprint
[1934)) 35. Compare F Machlup and E Penrose, 'The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century'
(1950) 10 J Economic History 1 (chronicling the European debates).
11
Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study no. 15 (Comm.
Print 1958) (written by Fritz Machlup) 79 (hereinafter 'Machlup Report'). The Machlup Report
observes that ' ... there is no functional relation berween the earnings under a patent. ... and the
"social usefulness" of the invention which it covers.' Machlup Report 30. In this line of analysis, the
Machlup Report observes that:

The question is no longer whether the patent system stimulates inventive talents to use
more of their time and energy than they otherwise would for the development of new
technology, but rather whether it stimulates business corporations to hire more of these
talents than they otherwise would for this task. If this is affirmatively answered, the second
question arises whether this use of the talents is superior to the alternative uses from which
they are diverted. (Machlup Report 36)
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What's to be done? 'Muddle through', wrote Machlup. Why? Because there has been
' ... a patent system for a long time', he declared,' ... it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge, to abolish it.' 12 There could be no weaker rationale for keeping patent protection.
It was under this cloud of indeterminacy that Kenneth Arrow published his landmark paper four years later. Like so many other sacred texts, Arrow's paper has
become the touchstone for theorists and others who identify themselves with the
orthodox approach as well as those who oppose it.
Arrow questioned the impact of competition on incentives to invent. For economists, perfect competition is rhe Holy Grail. Its miraculous power produces allocative efficiency by taking society's resources and putting them to their highest and best
uses. But Arrow argued that perfectly competitive markets fail. They fail by discouraging inventors from inventing.
Arrow's story has become a commonplace-without patent protection, inventions
are easily copied or imitated. Free access to their ideas discourages inventors from
inventing and, thus, harms society. Patent rights correct this market failure by allowing inventors to profit and society to benefit from increased invention. Patent protection and the profits it generates are the means to an end. Patents are private rights that
produce the public benefits of technological advancement and economic progress.
The dominant camp relies on the following quotation to support their call for stronger patent protection-'[Invention that is] .... available free of charge .... provides
no incentive for investment in research.' 13
Those who call for more access and thus more competition rely on this quotation' .... the incentive to invent is less under monopolistic than under competitive
conditions.' 14
Both statements are accurate quotations from Arrow's landmark article. So it turns
out both camps are right; and both are wrong. Why? Because reliance on one or the
other quotation ignores Arrow's recognition that an incentive theory of patent protection creates a dilemma for welfare economics. The dilemma is that both patent
rights and competition promote economic progress. And both impede it. Here is
how Arrow described the dilemma,

Nore that chis is a modern form of the question posed in the 19th century European debates about
what we would term the opportunity coses of diverting scarce resources. Compare Perin, 'Paten rs and
Progress: The Incentive Conundrum' in A Kur (ed} Intellectual Property Rights: Does one Size Fit Al'1
(Aldershor: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009} (selected papers, 2008 ATR/P Annual Conference, MaxPlanck Insrirure, Munich, Germany, 21July2008).
12
13

14

Machlup Report (n 11 above) 80.
Arrow (n 5 above} 609.
Arrow (n 5 above} 619.
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In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to
create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the information. 15
In short, patent protection is the private incentive necessary to spur invention and at
the same time the social cost that prevents its optimal use. Anow transformed this
dilemma ofIP rights and competition into a trade-off over time-pay more now for
better products in the future. 16
Let's call this Arrow's Trade-Off. Arrow posed the social welfare question as a tradeoff over time insofar as the current costs of patent monopoly pay for the future benefits of increased invention.
But in the end, Arrow's Trade-Off encompassed only part of the problem of IP's
social value. It addressed the narrow question ofIP's private value and its relationship
to direct public costs and benefits but not its indirect effects, including opportunity
costs. In consequence, the analysis did not speak to the Incentive Gap between the
private value and the overall public costs and benefits of IP protection. The subsequent economic literature continued to pursue the broader question. But the theoretical scholarship largely rehearsed the European debates and Arnold Plant's
economic analysis.
Empirical investigation

Ultimately the theoretical impasse resolved into empirical inquiry. What of the
empirical literature that followed? 17
A wide array of studies, almost all involving patents, developed various data sets to
investigate different proxies for economic progress. Researchers have interviewed
corporate decision makers; they have measured research and development expenditures and patenting activity on the input side, and productivity gains and economic
growth on the output side. Studies have looked at single sectors, individual countries, and across countries.
Arrow (n 5 above) 617.
' [A]n incentive to invent can exist even under perfect competition in the product markets,
though not, of course in the "market" for the information contained in the invention.' Arrow (n 5
above) 619. In his hypothetical world, Arrow does even better than transform a dilemma into a tradeoff. He creates a model that neatly eliminates the present cost of the trade-off. He posits perfectly
monopolistic markets for invention that provide inventors the greatest profit incentive and buyers in
perfectly competitive markets for goods provide consumers the widest distribution at the lowest price.
It's the best of all possible worlds though it is not the real world. In the real world, monopoly prices do
not dissolve into the thin air ofeconomic models. The hypothetical is perfected by Arrow's assumption
that the invention is a new process that provides cost savings in the goods market that equal the
monopoly prices paid for the new invention. Thus price and output in the goods market are not
affected. Neat and tidy. But unlikely and perhaps economically illogical. See Peritz, 'Thinking about
Economic Progress: Arrow and Schumpeter in Time and Space' (n 7 above).
17 A working paper that takes a closer look at the literature is available from the author: ' Patents and
Progress: The Incentive Conundrum' (2008).
15
16
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Patent economics: the residue
Where does that leave IP economics? Some alternatives to the mainstream approach
have emerged, alternatives ranging from conservative incrementalism to radical
repeal. Landes and Posner sit at the conservative end of the spectrum, where they
argue that we should try to optimize the system and do the best we can with what we
have. Economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine have been the latest to lay claim
to the radical end, where they argue that IP rights are not necessary because free
competition produces adequate profits to attract the invention necessary to promote
economic progress. Of course these positions as well as those between them are not
new. 20
A moment's tarry at the Landes and Posner position is worthwhile, in my view,
because it is likely to become the mainstream position, once the shock of incentive
theory's demise has subsided. Landes and Posner take up the view espoused in
Machlup's 1958 Report to Congress, the view that while the patent regime per se
cannot be rationalized, changes can be evaluated for their effectiveness. 21 For this,
Machlup developed a nine-step analysis and provided an example. The example is an
increase in the patent term. As the author pointed out, the analysis requires quantitative and qualitative assumptions at every step and, even then, it cannot take into
account the opportunity cost of more investment in research and development. In
short, even though the more confined analysis of changes in rules or standards benefits from having a defined baseline of current invention levels that is lacking in an
analysis of the patent regime per se, other problems of experimental design and
measurement remain. Machlup concluded that the analysis ofwhether an increase in
the patent term increases economic growth depends on ' ... a complex set of probabilities, the magnitudes of which depend [on] .. . many unknown variables.' 22
Following Plant and Machlup, Landes and Posner reject incentive theory. In its place
they adopt a series of more specific goals emphasizing reductions in, for example,
transaction costs, rent seeking, and congestion externalities. 23 In their chapter on
patent law, the authors proceed from the general point that patent protection ' . ..
makes economic sense because it curbs certain inefficiencies unavoidably created by
trade secrecy.' 24 In their view, those inefficiencies derive from a number of sources,

° Compare Peritz, 'Parents and Progress: The Incentive Conundrum' (n 11 above).

2

21

Machi up (n 11above)64-7, discussed in Peritz, ' Pacencsand Progress: The Incentive Conundrum'
(n 11 above) and a 2008 working paper (n 17 above).
22 Machlup (n 11 above) 64-7.
23 Congestion externalities reAecc a questionable reincroduccion of tragedy-of-the-commons logic
co public goods. The issue is ofquestionable importance for two reasons. First, because use of information (or invention, as Arrow called it) does not deplete its supply or quality; in chat sense, there cannot
be over-use. Second, because privatization presents an analogous problem, if there is one ac all, in the
form of the anci-commons-ofcen called patent chickers. In sum, congestion is either a two-sided
problem chat does nor resolve the question of propertization or ic is-no problem ac all.
24 Landes and Posner (n 3 above) 294.
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including the following-first, from the very nature of trade secrecy, which keeps
information our of the marker. Second, from the higher costs of trade secret licensing.
But these assertions turn our to be controversial. As co the first, Landes and Posner
themselves develop an elegant analysis of the relationship between patent and trade
secret chat belies the impact on information. In the chapter on trade secrets, they
assert patents are preferable only co the extent an invention is self-disclosing or likely
co be invented independendy. 25 Thar is, patents rend to disclose information char has
lowest public value. As to the higher cost of trade secret licensing, the authors identify a number ofhigher costs associated with patents char seem co offset the advantage
in licensing costs. Most celling, patent disclosure may lower the time to invent around
or, perhaps worse, enable infringement chat triggers expensive litigation with a
substantial risk of finding parent invalidity. 26
Landes and Posner take the substantive patent regime as a given and seek to optimize
its implementation, an enterprise that seems likely to become the mainstream
approach even though it is rife with the indeterminacy that devastates incentive
theory. In my view, sound economics calls for change in patent policy more severe
than fine-tuning.
Surprisingly, there might be a place in patent policy for a more limited conception of
incentive theory, a conception that rakes account of its limitations as well as the primacy of the free competition baseline. In this view, incentive theory becomes a sharp
instrument of focused industrial policy, one applied co target particular goals. Patent
rules might be changed co channel specific inventive activity coward green technology, cancer research, equality-inducing business methods, or ocher specific goals.
Such targeting would introduce a qualitative dimension to economic progress.
These judgments would place bees on particular social welfare consequences, political economic judgments char do not purport co serve the quantitative goal of economic growth. Thus, neither large scale nor narrow gauge cost-benefit analysis would
ensue. The question would be whether the added incentive would increase the targeted inventive activity beyond the current rare. Bur targeted incentives would be
bees and would raise difficulties of evaluation discussed above. Still, as Arrow recognized in his landmark paper, governments both here and abroad have long made
these sores of bets.
In addition to the risks of unsuccessful research and development, such judgments
bring the danger of unintended consequences. One current example is the unintended anti-competitive impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 1984 amendment to
the Food and Drug Act that was intended to increase the incentive to produce patented drugs by extending the patent term and at the same time increase competition
by opening the door co early market entry by generics manufacturers who claimed
25
26

Landes and Posner {n 3 above) 355-6.
Landes and Posner (n 3 above) 357.
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their generics did not infringe valid patents. In actual experience, such generic filings
are quickly answered with patent infringement cases filed by branded manufacturers.
These cases have often produced settlements that include reverse payments of large
sums from plaintiff branded pharmaceutical companies to defendant generics manufacturers in exchange for promises to keep their generic drugs off the market. Couns
have approved the settlements and rejected antitrust claims ofagreements in restraint
of competition, finding them not only consistent with the general law that encourages settlements but also within the exclusionary rights of the contested patents. In
consequence, consumers pay billions of dollars in higher prices and follow-on inventors are given the perverse incentive to invest resources that position them to litigate
and settle rather than develop and commercialize generic drugs.27
Certainly, patents can serve as a more focused instrument for targeted industrial
policy. Bue even there, risks of failure and unintended consequences call for careful
analysis to overcome the presumption that free competition better serves the goal of
promoting progress. 28 While the dynamic efficiency effects of both free competition
and patent rights are indeterminate, distributional effects provide a tie-breaker.
Patents that actually have economic value produce monopoly prices and, with them,
welfare losses in both static and dynamic terms. Noc only consumers but subsequent
inventors are worse off. In this light, a rule or policy that would strengthen patent
rights should first be shown to promote greater progress than would otherwise
occur.

C. Patent Jurisprudence: Ends, Means, Emergent
Emphasis on Competition
The frailcies of patent economics leave policy makers in a quandary. On the one
hand, there is no economic justification for patent protection as the primary means
for promoting economic growth. Indeed, the residual economics points to free competition as the presumptive means. On the other hand, the constitutional instruction remains-Congress and the judiciary must formulate patent policy to promote
progress. How can policy makers advance the constitutional purpose of patent
protection in light of the economics?

27 See eg, RJR Pericz, 'Three Statutory Regimes at Impasse: "Reverse Payments" in "Pay-for-Delay"
Settlement Agreements between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Companies' in J Drexl, W Grimes,
RJR Pericz, and E Swaine (eds) More Common Groundfor International Competition Law? (Aldershot:
Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 201O); CS Hemphill, 'Paying for Delay' (2006) 81 New York
UL Rev 1553; C Shapiro, '.Antitrust Limits to Patent Setdements'(2003) 34 RAND J Economics 31;
M O 'Rourke and JF Brodley, '.An Incentives Approach to Patent Settlements' (2003) 87 Minnesota L
Rev 1767.
28 In some circumstances, including the FDA example, there is no free competition to presume;
there, the question becomes one of betting that one targeted incentive is better than its alternatives.
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This section takes up patent jurisprudence, whose constitutional quandary is reflected
in a pair of tensions in means and ends. The tension in means has been expressed in
dominant and emergent strains of the jurisprudence. While the dominant strain
continues to treat patents as the primary engine for promoting progress, an emergent
alternative has recognized competition as the primary engine or, at the very least, an
instrumentality that deserves more recognition for its value in promoting progress.
These strains parallel the tension in means earlier seen in Arrow's Trade-Off. At the
same time, a second tension, this one in ends, lies entirely within the dominant
approach. It is a tension between the goals of more public knowledge or more material benefits. After unravelling these tensions, the section closes by organizing the
jurisprudence according to what can be called the patent life cycle. Patents are shown
to move through a life cycle in three stages, each one characterized by its own mix of
means and ends, and all of them driven by a fundamental commitment to
competition.
The dominant approach: an internal tension in ends
The Supreme Court has long declared that patent policy is founded on an incentive
theory, 'Since the primary aim of the patent laws is to promote the progress ofscience
and useful arts, an arrangement which diminishes the incentive is said to be against
the public interest.' 29 Last year the Federal Circuit Court ofAppeals characterized an
amendment to the Patent Act as a ' ... legislative effort to reinforce the value of the
patent statute as an innovation incentive.' 30 Although these pronouncements might
seem to be synonymous statements ofpatent policy, they are not. There is a subtle but
significant difference between them. 31 While the Supreme Court addressed the general enterprise of promoting progress, the Federal Circuit focused on innovation,
which reflects only one aspect of progress. Innovation is not invention but rather its
commercialization. The distinction between invention and innovation is important
in two respects. First, because attracting investment to innovation can draw investment away from invention. Second, because a focus on innovation defines the primary form ofprogress as material advancement ofday-to-day life through commercial
development of extant invention.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit's focus on material advancement diverges from numerous statements by the Supreme Court that' . . . [t]he primary purpose of our patent
system.... is directed to disclosure ofadvances in knowledge which will be beneficial

29

Transparent-Wrap Mach Corp vStokes &Smith Co, 329 US 637, 646 (1947) {Douglas,}).

° Cardiac Pacemakers, lncvStjude Medical, Inc, 576 F3d 1348, 137 1 {Fed Cir 2009).
31
3

There is a second subde difference as well- note that the Supreme Court writes chat ' ... an
arrangement which diminishes the incentive is said to be against the public interest.' The Court is careful to avoid the implication that it adopted this view. This is consistent with the scepticism expressed
in the text accompanying the next footnote.
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to society; it is ... an incentive to disclosure.' 32 In other words, patents make public
new knowledge which would otherwise be hidden under the blanket of trade secrecy.
The public value of new knowledge goes beyond the Enlightenment virtue of edification. It has use value for follow-on inventors-disclosure reduces the costs of competition by invention. Moreover, it accelerates the learning curve. In short, the public
benefit of disclosure is the free competition that results from free riding on the patented efforts of prior inventors. 33
This divergence is embedded in the Constitution's language of promoting the
'Progress of Science and useful Arts.' A twenty-first century restatement of the constitutional language calls for promoting the progress of knowledge and industrial
technology. Yet courts have seldom been asked to adjudicate the relationship between
advancing knowledge and advancing the material conditions of everyday life. Here
are two examples of court decisions whose outcomes turn on the choice of primary
public benefit.
The first example involves a dispute between two researchers who filed patent applications for the same pharmaceutical compound. The first to file was a biochemist for
a Japanese company but the first to invent was a professor at Cornell Medical School.
. As a general rule, patents in the United States are awarded to the first to invent. The
time of invention dates back to the moment of conception. In the US patent system,
the first to conceive the idea is supposed to win. It matters not who files first.
The professor should have won. But he lost. Why? The court refused to apply the
standard US rule because it determined the professor did not proceed with 'reasonable

32 'The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement
of the ans and sciences. Its inducement is directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will
be beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive co disclosure.' Sinclair & Carroll
Co v Interchemical Corp, 325 US 327, 330 (1945). 'The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
from an invention with substantial utility.' BrennervMamon, 383 US 519, 534 (1966). ' . .. the public
may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term.' Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc, 489 US 141, 147 (1989).
Yer the Supreme Court has long expressed some scepticism about the incentive value of IP rights.
For example, in the Marconi Wireless case of 1943, the Chief Justice remarked- 'For all I know rhe
basic assumption of our patent law may be false, and inventors and their financial backers do not need
the incentive of a limited monopoly to stimulate invention. Bur whatever revamping our patent laws
may need, it is the business of Congress to do the revamping.' Marconi Wireless T Co ofAmerica v US,
320
l , 63-4 (1943).
Here is an economic analysis of disclosure: Patent right and its disclosure obligation present the
righr strategy for those inventions not adequately protected as trade secrets. In this light, patented
inventions are chose most likely to be disclosed anyway and so the public really gains very little if
anything. Note the tension between this account and traditional norms and incentives to disclose in
the scientific community, tensions exacerbated with increased propertization and thus increased
incentive co withhold disclosure until the patent application is filed. Nore also the patent regime's
disincentives to read paten rs, especially intentional infringement liability for multiple damages.
33 Of course the incentive problem re-emerges. Should patent rights be shaped co encourage
publication of new knowledge or encourage internalization of pecuniary benefits?

us
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diligence' from the time he conceived the new idea to the time he reduced it to a
practical invention. In the court's view, there was unreasonable delay in his waiting for
outside research funding and for his chosen graduate student to enter the programme.
Confronted by a conflict between ' ... the interest in rewarding and encouraging
invention [and] the public's interest in the earliest possible disclosure', 34 the court
chose 'earlier disclosure over earlier invention' because it saw 'early public disclosure
[as] the "linchpfo of the patent system".'35 The outcome appears very European or
very Japanese insofar as the first to file was awarded the patent. But the rationale
reflects a uniquely American issue characterized as a conflict between the goals of
advancing knowledge and advancing industrial technology. 36
The second example of patent jurisprudence that seeks to adjudicate this conflict of
ends is even more dramatic. It is more dramatic because it involves the entire relationship between the patent and trade secret regimes, between the federal requirement of patent disclosure and the state trade secret requirement of secrecy. In the
United States, the Constitution expresses a general principle of harmonization in
what is called the Supremacy Clause. When a state law conflicts with federal law, the
federal law prevails; the state law is unconstitutional and thus unenforceable.
In practical terms, the Supreme Court had to find a way to harmonize two regimes
that had co-existed for more than 100 years; throwing out the trade secret laws of
50 states was unacceptable. 37 What to do? The Court characterized patent and trade
secret protection as harmonious because they both encourage technological advancement. In this view, they share the same goal. As for the conflict in disclosure, the
Court reduced its importance to triviality by asserting without foundation that
an inventor would always choose stronger patent over weaker trade secret protection.
But in some circumstances trade secrecy can provide stronger protection.
34

Griffith v Kanamaru, 816 F2d 624 (Fed Cir 1987). More specifically, the dace of invention generally relates back co the dace of conception. The first inventor is the first co conceive che idea. Bue here,
there was the unacceptable delay between the professor's conceiving the idea and his reducing it co
practice. And so the reduction dace was treated as the dace of invention. As for the commercial
researcher, there was no evidence to support either a dace of conception or a date of reduction-both
of them irrelevant in the Japanese as well as EU patent regimes. And so the patent filing dace was used
as the dace of invention. The Japanese filing date preceded the professor's reduction date, each of chem
proxies for the dace of invention.
35
Horwath v Lee, 564 F2d 948, 950 (Crc Customs & Patent App 1977).
36
Before going co my second example of the conflict between encouraging invention and encouraging its disclosure, between advancing technology and advancing knowledge, I want to cake a quick
look at the court's treatment of reasonable diligence. The professor's seeking necessary outside funding
and awaiting the return of his graduate student do not seem unreasonable per se. Still, the court
refused these typical academic reasons, seating that only personal reasons such as family illness, personal finances, or vacation time would excuse delay, even though arguments were made that outside
funding was a university research policy co validate projects through outside competitions for funds.
In that sense, there was no delay but rather another kind of evaluation or even competition chat was
going on. Without explanation, the court seemed much more approving of the commercial research
environment.
37
Kewanee OiL Cop Bicron Cory, 416 US 470 (1974).
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Indeed, market studies have found that many inventors prefer trade secret protection
for reasons IP economics, including the work of Landes and Posner, has made clear. 38
And so the orthodox patent jurisprudence has sought to mediate a tension within the
constitutional incentive logic of promoting progress, the tension in ends between
advancing knowledge and improving the material conditions oflife. The mediation
has affected adjudication of questions both narrow and broad-our two examples,
the narrow question of whom to deem the inventor of a particular product and the
broad question of how to characterize the relationship between the patent and trade
secret regimes. In each case, the choice of end affected the outcome, changed the
circumstances of inventive enterprise, and defined the conditions of competitive
activity-first in prosecuting patent applications and second in making strategic
choices between patent or trade secret protection.
The emergent approach: three recent patent cases and their countenance
While the dominant approach has grappled with a conflict in ends, the constitutional logic for promoting progress has produced a second tension as well. Recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence has shown signs of an approach different from the
orthodoxy, an emergent approach that raises questions about patent protection as
the presumptive means for promoting progress, questions that parallel those raised
in IP economics. This emergent approach is more properly termed a re-emergent
strain ofIP jurisprudence insofar as the recent decisions summon the policy stated in
Justice O'Connor's opinion some 30 years ago for a unanimous Court, the statement
that there is a' ... baseline of free competition upon which the patent system's incentive to creative effort depends.' In short, ' ... free exploitation of ideas will be the rule,
to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.'39
This line between patent monopoly and free competition is drawn by the statutory
requirements for patentability, most notably the requirement that a patented invention
be non-obvious in light of prior art.40 Beginning in the 1980s, the non-obviousness
requirement was increasingly trivialized. For example, in 1999, the Federal Circuit
Court ordered that the US Patent Office issue a patent to an applicant who decorated
large black plastic garbage bags with orange pumpkin faces. The Federal Circuit
declared that this combination of garbage bags and Halloween decoration, each element itself obvious, was a non-obvious combination that merited a patent. 41

38 See discussion accompanying n 48 below for the economic analysis of Landes and Posner on
strategic choices becween trade secrecy and patent protection.
39 Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 489 US 141, 145-7 (1989). Nore that Justice
O'Connor poses the baseline imagery within the orthodox view of incentive theory. But, as the first
section demonstrates, the baseline metaphor itself has an economic logic that does not depend on the
orthodoxy.
40 Patent Act§ J03(a}.
41
Re Dembiczak, 175 F3d 994 (Fed Cir 1999).

42

Chapter 2: Competition within IP Regimes
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission issued a widely praised Report criticizing
patent protection's descent into triviality. 42
Then, in 2007, the Supreme Court published the KSR decision, which elevated the
non-obviousness requirement for the largest category of patents, those like the
Halloween garbage bag that involve combinations ofprior arr. The decision instructed
the Patent Office to reject applications for combination that show only 'ordinary
creativity'. 43 The Patent Office has since rejected on the ground of obviousness a
number of applications for combination patents, and the courts have regularly
upheld those rejections.
The Court in KSR took issue with the Federal Circuit's ' ... transform[ation of a]
general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry.' The patent
principle holds that a combination is obvious to ' ... a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant field' when the prior art ' ... demonstrate[es] a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine known elements' into that combination. 44 The Federal
Circuit rigidified the principle ' ... by overemphasis on the importance of published
articles and the explicit content of issued patents.' This approach failed to take
account of 'common knowledge and common sense', which consider a larger body
of public knowledge, including 'design need and market pressure', knowledge which
seldom finds its way into the literature of prior art. Justice Kennedy observed that a
' . . . person ofordinary skill is also a person ofordinary creativity, not an automaton'. 45
This observation brings to the fore the difficulty of separating ordinary creativity
from the non-obvious type because '. . . inventions in most, if not all, instances
rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of
necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known. ' 46
The practical question, then, is what to do about the great bulk ofinventions that lie
in the bandwidth between the obviously ordinary and the obviously non-obvious. In
expanding the range of references for determining prior art, the Court in KSR raised
the level of non-obviousness required for patentability. Now, a combination may be
found obvious even without a reference in the prior art to 'teaching, suggestion or
motivation to combine known elements'.

42
See Federal Trade Commission, 'To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy' (October 2003) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 10/innovationrpt.pdf>
accessed 2 September 2010; see also, JH Barton, 'Non-Obviousness' (2003) 43 IDEA] L and
Technology 475; Working Group on the New Economy, American Anti cruse lnscicuce, 'Antitrust and
the New Economy: Comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Washington, D.C.'
Ouly 2005). <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amdpublic_scudies_fr28902/new_economy_pdf/0507 l 5_
AAI-New_Economy. pdf> accessed 2 September, 20 l 0.
43
KSR Int'! Co v Teleflex Inc, 127 S C c 1727, 1743 (2007) (hereinafter 'KSJ?).
44 KSR(n 43above) 174 1, 1742.
45
KSR (n43 above) 1743 (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH &Co Deutsch/andKG v CH Patrick Co,
464 F3d 1356, 1367 (Fed Cir 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
KSR (n 43 above) 17 4 1.
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It should be noted that the very process of determining non-obviousness in the
course of patent application is in effect a contest in ideas, a competition between
prior art and the prosecuted invention. The standard is whether the invention
embodies an advance in ideas that is not obvious in the light of prior art. KSR raises
the level of difficulty for the new arrival to win this competition in ideas. 47
Given that the heightened standard will exclude a class of combination inventions
that met the old standard for non-obviousness but fail the new one, what are the
likely effects? Some of the newly obvious combinations, especially those involving
processes, can be hidden from public view and, thus, their owners can seek trade
secret protection. In this instance, public information about such combinations will
be lost until the secrets are discovered. Owners of newly obvious combinations which
are self-disclosing on sale or use will proceed in reliance on licensing provisions, firstmover advantages, or simply the benefits of the new combination when they outweigh the competitive costs of imitation by others. The resulting mix of secret and
public combinations is an empirical question.
Moreover, there is a strategic question that sheds some light on the matter. As Landes
and Posner have observed, the choice between patent and trade secret protection
depends on their relative value. 48 On the cost side, patents are more expensive to
obtain. And patent disclosure provides the very information rivals need to invent
around more cheaply or simply infringe when that makes strategic sense. On the
benefit side, a patent becomes more valuable than trade secret protection as the risk
of disclosure, reverse engineering, or independent invention increases. As a general
matter, the inventor is more likely to seek patent protection for inventions that are
more likely to become public knowledge or otherwise legally available to rivals.
Inventions whose secrecy is more readily maintained are less likely to be patented.49
In sum, KSKs heightened standard for non-obviousness increases the play of competition, either immediately by direct imitation or eventually by investigation, independent discovery, or reverse engineering. The Court has denied patent protection
for inventions that reflect only 'ordinary creativity' and, in consequence, expanded
access to inventions that were protected under the old rule. so The result is that
47 The stacutory requirement of usefulness assures that the invention is not a disembodied idea: 35
USC § 101. For further discussion of this point, see Peritz, 'Patents and Progress: The Incentive
Conundrum' (n 11 above).
48 Landes and Posner (n 3 above) 354-71. Note as well that patents are less expensive to maintain
and license.
49
In this light, the loss of public knowledge from patent publication should nor be overestimated.
Nor should a decline in public knowledge resulting from the heightened standard of parentabilicy.
so The extent of access to competitors under the new approach deserves further comment insofar
as it depends on the character of prior art embodied in the combined elements. If no elements are protected by patents still in force, then access to the new combination is entirely free and competition is
simply extended. If, however, any element is still protected, then use of the new combination requires a
licence from each parent holder. Bur no parent licence is required to practice the combination. The net
effect in either case is free access to the combination and, with it, lower bargaining and licensing costs.
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competitors now have free access to make, use, and sell inventions that would have
been protected by combination patents under the lower level of creativity.
In a second recent patent decision, a unanimous Supreme Court in eBay tightened
the requirement for obtaining an injunction against a patent infringer. A more stringent requirement means that infringing competitors are not so easily restrained from
making, using, or selling patented inventions; instead, the remedy of compulsory
licences opens competition to patent infringers who would otherwise have been
excluded from the market. 51
The unified Court in eBay once again rejected an instance of the Federal Circuit's
rigid jurisprudence of expansive patent rights, this time its ' ... general rule that
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.' In rejecting this general rule, the Court held that issuance of
permanent injunctions summons'. . . familiar principles [of equity that] apply with
equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.' 52 Justice Thomas' opinion for
the Court provides a clear and unembellished basis for a more flexible approach,
As this Court has long recognized, 'a major departure from the long tradition of
equity practice should not be lightly implied.' Nothing in the Patent Act indicates
that Congress intended such a departure. To the contrary, the Patent Act expressly
provides that injunctions 'may' issue 'in accordance with the principles of equity'. 53

While the opinion for the Court does not venture beyond the statutory text and
equity doctrine to make plain the outcome, two concurring opinions offer differing
policy analysis for support. Both address an issue raised in the opinion by Justice
Thomas, particularly in a passage that rejected the Federal Circuit's reasoning for its
general rule for issuing permanent injunctions. The Federal Circuit had concluded
that the Patent Act's explicit definition of a patent as '. .. having the attributes of
personal property', particularly'. .. the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention ... alone justifies its general rule'. Justice
Thomas quoted specific statutory language that provides for the judicial discretion
associated with traditional equity practice, observing that' ... the creation of a right
is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right. ' 54 The two

In all circumstances, however, rhe inrervenrion of trade secret protection muse be caken inro account,
wich consequences as described in rhe texc accompanying this foocnoce.
51
eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 126 SCt 1837 (2006) (hereinafrer 'eBay'}. Of course rhe infringing user muse bear a reasonable royalry as determined by the court. This can be understood as shifting
from rhe patent holder co rhe court rhe power to determine royalties. In consequence, rhe patent
holder cannot hold up would-be competitors in whac is rypically a one-sided monopoly bargaining
scenario chat does not promise rhe efficienr solution generally amibuced co secclemenrs and bargain
contracts more generally, per rhe Coase Theorem.
52
eBay (n 51 above} 1839 (borh quotations in rhe paragraph).
53 eBay(n 51above)1839 (citationsomicced}.
54
eBay (n 51 above} 1840 (citing 35 USC.§§ 261, 154(a)(l)).
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concurring opinions assert sharply different rationales for treating the distinction
between th e exclusionary n ature of p ro p erty rig h ts an d t h e exclu sio n ary rem edy of
injunction.
ChiefJustice Roberts understood the relationship between rightand remedy reflected
in the statutory provisions to be reflected in a 'long tradition of equity practice' to
grant injunctions 'upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority ofpatent cases'
on account of 'che difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary damages that allow an infringer to use the invention against che patentee's wishes.' 55 In
sum, Justice Robercs was instructing federal judges not to stray from that 'long tradition' of recognizing patents as fundamentally property rights to exclude, rights
to empower individual choice about how co practice the invention, or whether to
practice it at all.
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion gave a diametrically opposed rationale for
the Court's declaration that che statutory definition of patent as property right does
not necessarily define the remedy for its violation. At the outset, Justice Kennedy
rejected the Chief Justice's view chat the difficulty of fully protecting patent rights
with monetary damages underlies a 'long tradition' chat calls for judges to conserve
the property rights in patents. In sharp contrast, Kennedy's opinion looks forward
rather than back. le invests the equitable nature ofinjunctive relief with a progressive
ability to adjust to change, ' [I]n many instances che nature of the patent being
enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations
quite unlike earlier cases.' Two examples are given-first, 'industries in which firms
use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees'; second, 'patents over business methods', which raise significant questions of'vagueness and suspect validity'.56 Boch examples reflect concerns
chat patent rights to exclude can be questionable barriers co the market entry needed
for competition to flourish.
It is no accident chat Justice Kennedy's source for both examples is the Federal Trade
Commission report entitled 'To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy'. A balance between access and exclusion is
required because experience and economics cell us chat both competition and patent
rights can promote innovation as well as the invention chat precedes it. In chis light,
injunctive relief for patent infringement should not be granted, particularly to patent trolls or business patent holders, when it resulcs in less progress than competition
or compulsory licensing. 57 Justice Kennedy cautions against che dangers of excessive

55

eBay (n 51 above) 1840 (joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Antonin Scalia) (emphasis
in original).
56 eBay (n 51 above) 1842 Qustice Kennedy joined by Justices Stevens, Sourer and Breyer) (for all
quotations in the paragraph).
57 eBay (n 5 1 above) I 842 (based on the FTC Report).
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patent protection and, with it, inadequate regard for competition as a powerful
means to promote progress through innovation.

In the third recent case, the competition logic driving Justice Kennedy's concurrence
emerges even more emphatically in Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent from the
Metabolite decision. Justice Breyer's opinion questions the wisdom of dismissing the
writ earlier granted in a case that addresses the fundamental patent imperative to
'[e]xclude from ... patent protection ... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas.'58
What is so important about this issue? In Justice Breyer's view, granting a 'monopoly
over a basic scientific relationship' upsets a careful balance embodied in patent rights,
' ... [S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.'59
Justice Breyer was concerned about public access to ' .. . the basic tools of scientific
and technological work' and, as such, to ' ... part of the storehouse of knowledge and
manifestations oflaws of nature as free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.'
The rationale for free access lies in the public policy to promote progress by encouraging 'development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself.' 60
What exactly is this careful balance embodied in patent rights? Justice Breyer incorporates it by reference to Justice O'Connor's Bonito Boats opinion for a unanimous
Court,
The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between che need co encourage innovation
and che avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition wichouc any concomitant
advance in che 'Progress of Science and useful Arcs.' ... [T]he stringent ... novelty
and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional determination chat the
purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is already available co the public or that which may be readily
discerned from publicly available material.61

Justice Breyer was reminding readers that the patent regime begins, as Justice
O'Connor put it, with 'the baseline of free competition ... [from] which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.'62 Arid so Justice Breyer concluded his opinion in Metabolite with references to competition policy- not only the Bonito Boats

58
Lab Corp of Am Holdings v Metabolite Labs, Inc, 126 SCc 2921, 2922 (2006) (hereinafter
'Metabolite') Oustice Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter, dissenting from
opinion co dismiss wric of certiorari as improvidently granted).
59
Metabolite (n 58 above) 2925 (citations omitted).
60
Metabolite (n 58 above) 2923 (citations andincernal quocacion marks omitted).
61
Bonito Boats, Incv Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 489 US 141 , 146, 150 (1989) (hereinafrer'Bonito
Boats'); Metabolite (n 58 above) 2926 (citing Bonito Boats 146).
62
Bonito Boats (n 61 above) 156, 151.
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decision but also the FTC Report and former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky's
article on antitrust and intellectual property rights. 63
Each of these patent cases expresses an aspect of an emergent jurisprudence-first,
granting rights to exclude competitors only with respect to non-obvious inventions;
second, determining the propriety of exclusionary remedies by equitable principles
rather than by the property logic of patent ownership; and finally, maintaining public access to 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas'. Every one of
these propositions limits the exclusionary power of patent protection. Each one widens public access to inventions or to the knowledge embodied in those inventions.
The result is increased weight attributed to the patent regime's internal policy of free
competition as an engine to promote progress.
These recent calls to competition are not exceptional. 64 Patent monopoly has long
been disfavoured in the United States. As Thomas Jefferson put it over 200 years ago,
the patent system must draw ' ... a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment ofan exclusive patent, and those which are not.' 65 Indeed,
the Supreme Court is currently considering a closely-watched case that presents
questions posed by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer, questions about the
scale and scope of patentable subject matter and thus the reach ofexclusionary rights
in information technology. 66
The patent life cycle: three stages of competition
The twin tensions reflected in the patent jurisprudence, the tensions in means and
ends, resolve differently in the course of what can be called the patent life cycle.
Patents move through three stages, each one comprising a technological and a legal
component. Schumpeter, FM Scherer, and other economists have characterized
technological change as the well-known steps of invention, innovation, and imitation or diffusion. 67 The legal component of the patent life cycle runs through the
stages of patent prosecution, patent term, and patent expiry.
63

Metabolite (n 58 above) 2929.
For a recent trade dress decision that echoes Justice O'Connor's call to a baseline of competition,
see Wal-Mart v Samara, 529 US 205, 213- 14 (2000). The opinion was written by Justice Antonin
Scalia, usually the Court champion of property rights and freedom of contract.
65 13 Writings oflhomas Jefferson (Memorial ed 1904) 335, cited in, eg, Bonito Boats (n 61 above)
148. This passage and others suggest the possibility that for the 18th century founding fathers, property rights had a natural incentive effect. In this view, there was no fundamental distinction between
property as natural rights and as incentives.
66 Re Bilski, 545 F3d 943 (Fed C ir 2008), cert. granted sub nom Bilski v Doll 129 SCt 2735
(2009).
67 'Invention to [Schumpeter] was the act of conceiving a new product or process and solving
the purely technical problems associated with its application. Innovation involved the
entrepreneurial functions required to carry a new technical possibility into economic practice for the first time--identifying the market, raising the necessary funds, building a new
organization, cultivating the market, etc. Imitation or diffusion is the stage at which a new
product or process comes into widespread use as one producer after another follows the
64
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During the patent prosecution stage, the claimant must persuade the patent examiner
that there is an invention and that it merits protection. 68 The applicant is free to
engage in innovation and further invention during prosecution. The process is confidential. 69 Diffusion of knowledge is delayed until the application and file folder are
published by the Patent Office-until the patent is issued though even sooner in
many cases. 70 Patent prosecution can be understood as a competition in ideas pitting
the invention against the body of prior art in a contest refereed by a patent examiner
according to a strict set of rules and guidelines. If the invention is useful and proper
subject matter, ifit is clearly described, and, finally, ifit is not anticipated by the prior
art, ifit is not obvious, then it embodies new knowledge whose embodiment is worthy
of patent protection. 71 The competition in this phase of the life cycle produces the
private right to exclude and what can be called the patent's public knowledge benefit.
The knowledge benefit's crucial importance to the prosecution stage can be seen in
the strict requirement that the description of the invention in the patent application
be clear and complete, and that it enable those reasonably skilled in the art to make
and use it. The applicant must also include any additional knowledge concerning the
best mode of making and using the invention. The description and enablement
requirements provide two kinds of public knowledge benefit. First, the description
requirement separates the idea from its embodiment, the public benefit from the
private property by assuring that the applicant has reduced the idea to practice.
Without a strict description requirement, there would be the danger of patenting the
idea, of turning the public benefit into private property. Second, as the Supreme
Court stated long ago, if the description is so vague and uncertain that no one can

innovating firm's lead.' F Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Market Performance
(1970) 350.
The rhree seeps are not murually exclusive. Indeed, rhey are best understood as overlapping and inrertwined. Compare Pericz, 'Freedom co Experimenr: Toward a Concept oflnvenror We.Ifare' (2008) 90
J Pacenr and Trademark Office Society 245.
68
Though rhe statute states rhac patenr ' ... will be granred unless', in practical terms most applications are rejected initially and rhus the burden falls on the applicanr.
69
In some circumstances, provisional rights to damages are available for third party use during the
prosecution stage, but only after the pacenr has been issued. PacenrAct § 154(d).
70
' Publication ofpacenr applications is required by the American Invenrors Protection Ace of 1999
for most plant and utility patenr applications filed on or after 29 November 2000. On filing of a plant
or utility application on or after 29 November 2000, an applicant may request chat the application not
be published, but only if the invention has not been and will not be the subject of an application filed
in a foreign counrry chat requires publication 18 months after filing (or earlier claimed priority date)
or under the Patent Cooperation Treacy. Publication occurs after the expiration ofan 18-monch period
following the earliest effective filing date or priority date claimed by an application. Following publication, the application for pacenr is no longer held in confidence by the Office and any member of the
public may request access to rhe entire file history of rhe application.' USPTO, 'General Information
Concerning Patents' <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/#pub> accessed 2
September,2010. PatenrAct§ 122.
71
Of course, in addition co non-obviousness, requirements of utility, novelty, and proper subject
matter muse be met.
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tell, except by independent experiment, how to construct the patented device, the
patent is void. 72 In other words, the information must be sufficient to enable subsequent inventors to learn from the description. With less stringent requirements of
description and enablement, the patent prosecution phase would produce the worst
of all possible outcomes- private commercial rights to an idea and public knowledge without use value. The domain of ideas would shrivel while monopoly in
commercial markets would expand.
The life cycle's second stage begins when the patent is issued. During the patent term,
the owner holds a right to exclude others from using the invention for any purpose
including innovation and further invention.73 This right to exclude is the condition
underlying the patent holder's power to license the technology and in consequence
take advantage of downstream efficiencies of development, production, and distribution. Licensing the technology or otherwise using the invention is of course subject to general legal requirements and restrictions. A private right to the commercial
benefits of the invention promises a public benefit-the material benefit of improved
conditions ofeveryday life. In this stage of the life cycle, two kinds of competition are
anticipated. First, the patent holder is encouraged to commercialize the invention
and offer it on the market. Nonetheless, a material benefit from commercial competition is not guaranteed because the patent holder has no obligation to work the
patent and even if she does, consumers might not buy it. Second, competitors have
access to the new knowledge and often the invention itself, and can make practical
use of it by improving or inventing around it. However, this competition by experimental use is severely restrained in the United States.74
The third stage of the patent life cycle begins with the grant's expiry. The patent's
limited term creates a further material benefit when, after 20 years in the case of a
utility patent, the invention itself falls into the public domain. This reversion to
public use75 triggers a general privilege to use the invention and, in so doing, invites
commercial competition by imitation that promises to lower prices and, thus, to
disseminate more widely the invention's material benefits. Moreover, to the extent
invention follows imitation, there is further competition in both ideas and
commerce.

72 The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 US 465 (1895). The patenting of computer software raises
important questions about the knowledge benefit. The description element is satisfied by language of
general means that does not require publication of source code. The result is patents that are too broad
and information that is too vague to be useful. My approach would not permit the current approach
to software patents.
73 In the United States, there is virtually an absolute ban on unlicensed experimental use. Peritz,
'Freedom to Experiment: Toward a Concept oflnventor Welfare' (n 67 above).
74 Peritz, ' Freedom to Experiment: Toward a Concept oflnventor Welfare' (n 67 above).
75 The public's future interest is a reversion to the transferor in the constitutional sense that patents
are not common law property rights but rather statutory grants for a term of years that reserve a reversionary interest in the public.
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Each stage of the patent life cycle reflects a different sort of competition, each one
conditioned by the regime's rules and policies, which express resolutions of the tensions in means and ends. As discussion of the Griffith and Kewanee Oil decisions has
shown, resolving the tension in ends by (not) privileging the knowledge benefit over
the material benefit can have dramatic consequences. In similar fashion, taking competition as the presumptive starting point for adjudication of patent rights can also
have powerful effects. For instance, in making it more difficult to obtain an injunction remedy for patent infringement, the Supreme Court in eBay weakened the patent holder's property right to exclude and thereby opened the market to increased
competition in the second stage of the patent life cycle. Similarly, when the KSR decision raised the standard of non-obviousness for combination patents in the patent
prosecution phase to change the conditions of competition in ideas, it effectively cut
back the scope of exclusionary rights and increased commercial competition in the
second stage. And when Justice Breyer in his Metabolite dissent explicitly called for
protection of the public knowledge benefit by limiting the subject matter of patent
rights, the intended effect was to change the prosecution stage's conditions for competition in ideas and thereby extend the reach of public access to subject matter that
would otherwise fall under the private control of patent holders.
These recent cases present not only a common dynamic of tensions, but a common
resolution. They reflect an underlying commitment to competition policy expressed
in the patent regime. Their approach resonates with the political economy described
in Justice O'Connor's Bonito Boats opinion for a unanimous Court. That is not to say
this sample of opinions provides enough data to infer a new orthodoxy in patent
jurisprudence, one that recognizes the illogic of an IP economics founded on incentive theory. Indeed, Justice O 'Connor's opinion itself presents the baseline of free
competition as the necessary condition for an incentive theory of patents. But the
sample is enough to say there is an emergent strain of patent jurisprudence that
reveals a preference for competition policy, an emergent strain of patent jurisprudence that converges with a residual IP economics of competition, an economics
that does not depend on an unfounded incentive theory as the logic for privileging
exclusionary rights to promote economic progress.

D. Patents as a Competition Regime: Some Consequences
This section concludes the chapter by suggesting some additional changes that would
result from extending the patent regime's emergent jurisprudence and the residual
economics of competition.
The recent Supreme Court decisions discussed offer examples of what complexity
theorists call the 'butterfly effect'- a small change in initial conditions that produces
a radical change in system behaviour. It takes its name from the familiar image of a
butterfly in New York City's Central Park, a butterfly whose fl uttering wings alter the
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course of an entire weather system in the Amazon rain forest. 76 A presumptive shift
in patent jurisprudence to competition policy is a small change, a change well within
the traditional view chat both exclusionary rights and free competition drive economic progress. The same can be said for privileging the public knowledge benefit
over the material benefits anticipated from the patent regime. These changes in initial conditions are incremental, not radical. They are small but, as recent decisions
demonstrate, they can effect sharp and surprising turns in patent policy. 77
Further changes, large and small, could come of chis shift in initial conditions, a
procedural shift in patent jurisprudence to the presumption chat free competition
promotes progress, a shift supported by the residual economics. Each stage of the
patent life cycle would be understood as reflecting a baseline of competition, a primary commitment to the public knowledge benefic,78 a narrowly targeted version of
incentive theory, and in sum a patent policy chat serves the constitutional purpose of
promoting progress. Here are a three further instances of such changes, the last one
extended into a specific example derived from the EU Microsoft case.
The first involves the 'experimental use' defence to patent infringement. Almost
25 years ago, the Federal Circuit transformed unauthorized experimental use of
another's patented invention into patent infringement. The rationale lay in a
questionable extension of the already questionable logic of incentive theory. The
court determined chat a patent holder's power over the invention should extend
beyond commercial profit to control of its every use. Why? The court began by
attributing a 'business interest' co everyone from garage tinkerers to research scientists, a business interest chat was itself seen as endangering the incentive value of
patents. An unlicensed researcher could overcome this powerful presumption of
a business interest only when the purpose was literally the 'idle curiosity' of a

76 This effect can be called radical incrementalism, meaning that small differences in the initial
condition of a dynamic system may produce large variations in its long-term behaviour. The concept
of sensitive dependence on initial conditions was developed by French mathematician R Thom,
Structural Stability and Morphogenesis: An Essay on the General Theory of Models (Reading, Mass:
Benjamin, 1975) and was popularized later as Catastrophe Theory in EC Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory,
(April, 1976) Scientific American 65. It was a precursor to Chaos Theory and Complexity Theory.
On Complexity Theory and dynamic efficiency, see Peritz, Dynamic Efficiency' in A Cuccinota,
R Pardolesi, & R Van den Bergh (eds) Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law (Aldershot: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2002) I 08 fn 30 and accompanying text.
77 The shift in IP economics, however, would not be perceived as small. This effect is an extreme form
of the tipping phenomenon derived from mathematician Rene Thom's Catastrophe Theory: a sudden
and irreversible change in direction from a preceding course that appeared steady and reversible.
Examples include stock market volatility, fight and flight reactions to danger, and the last straw.
78 Of course a primary commitment to the public knowledge benefit would call for reconsideration
ofthe Kewanee Oil decision. For discussion, see Peritz, 'Patents and Competition: Toward a Knowledge
Theory of Progress' in LM Genovesi (ed) Intellectual Property Rights and Market Power(2009) (selected
papers from ATRIP annual conference, Parma, Italy, September 2006).
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'dilettante affair'.79 Since the doctrine's announcement, not one published decision
has reported a successful 'experimental use' defence co patent infringement.
The demise of the traditional privilege to engage in unauthorized experimental use
of a patented invention is another instance of the propertization trend that has been
expanding IP protection in the United States. Ir is a particularly harmful instance
because experimental use is perhaps the most important form of competition during
the patent term. If unauthorized experimentation were seen instead as presumptively
competitive conduce, then the patent holder would be required to prove actual commercial injury and public harm, all of which results not from imagined intentions
but from actual commercial conduce, from making, using, and selling. In short, a
viable 'experimental use' defence would not harm patent holders' legitimate interests
in exclusive rights to commercial profit during the patent term.
Moreover, the current stranglehold on unlicensed experiment disserves the public
interest in three ways. First, it in effect extends the 20-year patent monopoly by the
time necessary for rivals to engage in research and development of products for offer
on the market. 80 Second, the current regime empowers patent holders to control coo
much of follow-on research, a power inconsistent with the unlimited availability of
improvement patents to all who meet the statutory requirements. Patent's open door
policy for follow-on research is in sharp contrast to the Copyright Act's treatment of
derivative works, whose protection is available only to the holder of the underlying
copyrighc. 81 Third, the patent holder's control over research also channels and
restrains the production of new knowledge intended to replenish the public domain.
More widespread competition and cooperation in research during the patent term
would produce public benefits by lowering the costs, expanding the field of improvement patents, opening the production of new knowledge, limiting the patent term
to its statutory boundary, and, if relevant, serving the national interest by bringing
the United Scares in line with most of the rest of the world, to which unlicensed
research activities likely immigrate to escape the harsh US regime.
My second example involves purified forms of naturally occurring substances.
Produce patents have been granted for them regularly since an early 20th-century
decision, which affirmed a grant for the purified hormone adrenalin on the ground
that it was 'a new thing commercially and therapeutically'. 82 While this rationale
emerged from a focus on commercial markets, the actual effects were much broader

79
Roche Prods vBolar Pharma Co, 733 F2d 858 (Fed Cir 1984) (citing as most persuasive precedent
Pitcairn v US, 547 F2d 1106 (Cc Cl 1976)). This expanded view of patent rights is a nacural result of

viewing chem through the prism of property logic.
8
Compare Bruwtu v Thys Co, 379 US 29, 32 (1964) (licensing agreement extending beyond
patent term per se violation offederal patent law}; Pimey Bowes, Inc vMestre, 70 I F2d 1365 (I I ch C ir
1983} (same).
81
The current treatment of derivative works also reflects overprotection, in this author's view.
82
Parke-DavisvMulford, 189 F2d 95(SONY1911).

°
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because of the standard scope of protection afforded product patents in the United
States-the product patent practically encompassed the very idea of purified adrenalin insofar as it included not only the product but its equivalents for all uses not only
known at the time but also discovered later. 83

An approach beginning with the presumption of competition as patent's baseline
would begin by confining the scope of protection to what was actually inventedthe new process of purification and the method of using purified adrenalin. Beyond
the specific process and method of use, open competition would prevail. The product and with it the idea of purified adrenalin would be freely available in the public
domain. 84
In a very recent decision that has attracted attention, a federal court in New York City
ruled that isolated and purified DNA was not patentable because it lacked 'markedly
different characteristics' from native DNA.85 The plaintiffs referred to the Adrenalin
case in arguing, 'Isolated DNA molecules should be treated no differently than other
chemical compounds for patent eligibility.' But the court rejected the reference by
distinguishing DNA from other chemical compounds in the body-while adrenalin
and other compounds necessarily convey information, DNA encodes an entirely
different kind of information, not about its own molecular structure involving its
own biological function but rather about its biological function of directing the
synthesis of other molecules in the body. This distinction was dispositive because, in
the court's view, the isolated and purified DNA carried precisely the same information as the native DNA and thus lacked 'markedly different characteristics'.
The court recognized the importance of the case in stating,
The widespread use of gene sequence information as the foundation for biomedical
research means that resolution of these issues will have far-reaching implications, not
only for gene-based health care and the health of millions ofwomen facing the specter
ofbreast cancer, but also for the future course of biomedical research.
In short, competition and cooperation in gene research would not be controlled by
patent holders. Despite the court's special treatment of DNA, the same could be said

83 Only parenrs for improved or new production processes or methods of use were possible. The
resulr would be blocking parents.
84 With a rargered incentive theory, the question might be whether ir would be good industrial
policy to supporr the exclusionary regime of a producr parenr for adrenalin and a suitably defined
caregory of naturally occurring substances in order co channel research and developmenr in a direction
that is currenrly neglected under what would otherwise be a regime of open access required by free
competition. Since the question would call for a judgmenr abour industrial policy, it would be for
Congress co legislare some combination of general srandards and specific rules for the Parenr Office,
which would promulgare guidelines for its examiners, who would provide rechnological expertise, as
they do now, according co guidelines in the prosecution stage of the parenr life cycle.
85 Association for Molecular Pathology v US Patent and Trademark Office, SONY, No 09 Civ 4515,
29 March 2010.
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for generally denying produce parents for purified forms of all nacurally occurring
substances.
The lase example involves che description and enablement requirement already discussed in the jurisprudence section-here, the requirement as ic applies co computer
software. Ten years ago che Federal Circuit Courc declared char a general functional
description satisfies the requirement86 for sofcware parents. The practical consequence of these cases is lack of adequate description and enablement. The description is insufficient co assure char che claimant actually 'has possession' ofche invention
rather chan simply a general idea about ics function. Moreover, enabling a skilled
programmer co make or use che software would require flow charcs, source code, and
che derailed descriptions thac annocace modules, descriptions char computer programmers cuscomarily include as documentation for ochers who subsequently need
co understand, change, or fix che source code. Both prococols87 and programmer
comments are embedded in source code listings, while prococols also appear in software documentation. Why is a general functional description enough for che Federal
Circuit Court and, chus, for che Parent Office though ic does nor meet industry
standards? Because, according co the courc, conversion offunctional description into
source code is 'a mere clerical function co a skilled programmer'. 88
The court's rationale rings hollow for anyone who has accually designed or wriccen
operating systems or complex applications software. Indeed, no judge siccing on the
Federal Circuit could have taken the scared view afcer having any accual experience
in the field. The author of this chapter spent some years designing and writing such
software, and the experience evidences che reality char conversion of systems design
specifications co source code is often challenging work thac involves much more than
mere clerical function. Nonetheless, che Federal Circuit in ics nescience requires only
a general description of che software process.
While general information about software function has some limited value, ics sacisfaccion of the parent disclosure requirement creates cwo problems. First, general
claims and descriptions produce software parents char are too broad and, as a result,
foreclose coo much competition as functional equivalents. This problem includes
treatment of business method inventions, which are typically embodied in software.
Second, chere is insufficient information flow for subsequent invencors. The combination is deadly-broad parent rights and liccle public information about chem. This
sicuacion is exacerbated by che acknowledged difficulty in locating and identifying
prior arc in che category of computer software.
86

Pacenc Ace§ 112. The courc acknowledged chac more mighc be required in special cases.
A protocol is a standard procedure and format chac cwo computers or ocher devices muse understand, accept, and use in order co communicate wich one another. Examples include necwork log on
procedures and hem! format.
88
Northern Telecom, Inc v Datapoint Corp, 908 F2d 931, 942 (Fed Cir 1990) (citing Re Sherwood,
613 F2d 809, 817 fn 6 (CCPA 1980)).
87
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If the patent regime is intended to encourage learning from prior art and thereby
foster competition by invention, the level and quality of information must be
improved. The current requirement of a general process description requires only a
low level of information and, in consequence, erects a barrier to further invention, a
barrier that benefits the patent holder by keeping rivals out, rather than an information flow that benefits society by enabling others to improve and surpass the
invention.
Moreover, a surprising anomaly arises-despite the patent requirement of disclosure, specific code modules in patented software can be protected as trade secrets.
The patent requirement of disclosure and anomaly of trade secrecy in its midst can
co-exist because of the Federal Circuit's general description requirement. Recognizing
the public knowledge benefit of competition in ideas during the prosecution stage of
the patent life cycle would call for a more demanding description and enablement
standard for computer sofrware. The change would call for disclosure of the source
code and system documentation that industry practices recognize as needed to enable
subsequent work on the software.
Moreover, in the broader ambit of innovation policy, a proper patent requirement to
disclose would obviate the need for antitrust litigation to resolve some issues of
interoperability and disclosure through compulsory licensing of patented sofrware.
The EU Microsoft antitrust case provides a handy example because it involved computer sofrware for which Microsoft asserted patent and trade secret protection as
defences to antitrust liability for refusals to disclose information rivals needed for the
continued interoperability of their sofrware with Microsoft WINDOWS for PCs.
How would the analysis ofIP claims proceed if antitrust were no longer seen as the
sole source of a conflicting competition policy? And if patent policy were no longer
seen as driven exclusively by property rights to exclude competitors? Instead, let's
look at policies of exclusion and access not in opposition to one another, not in
antithetical domains of patent and antitrust, but rather in a joint venture to set the
conditions for relationships of competition and cooperation.89

89
Wesley Hohfeld made the fundamental point thar properry righrs can be besr undersrood as
relarions berween persons wirh respecr ro a thing rather than berween a person and a thing. W Hohfeld,
'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' ( 1923) 23 Yale LJ 16; JW
Singer, 'The Legal Righrs Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham ro Hohfeld' (1982)
Wisconsin L Rev 975. This chaprer rakes up this well-known relarional conception of properry righrs
and exrends it to competition and cooperation. The extension is indebted to the voluminous literature
about the interplay berween competition and cooperation- whether literature relating directly ro
innovation and efficiencies or more broadly throughout the social and management sciences. Much of
the literature is informed by game theory, from the simple prisoners' dilemma ro complex multilayered iterative games. For a brief introduction to a game theory approach ro parallel commercial
conduct, see Perit:z, 'Doctrinal cross-dressing in derivative afrermarkets: Kodak, Xerox and the copycat
game' (2006) 51 Antitrust Bulletin 287 and sources cited therein.
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In the actual Microsoft case, the Court of First Instance (CFI), now the General
Court, affirmed the Commission judgment that Microsoft abused its <lominant
position in the market for PC operating systems by leveraging WINDOWS' dominance into the market for work group server operating systems. The CFI concluded
that Microsoft wrongfully applied this leverage in refusing to disclose to rivals in the
server market information they needed for continued interoperation with work
group PCs running WINDOWS. 90 The information included interface protocols
and an 'Active Directory' ('Directory'), which organized the protocols in an arguably
original way that allowed Microsoft's server software to interoperate smoothly and
. efficiently with WINDOWS. Microsoft claimed that patent and trade secret protection allowed them to deny access to this information. 91
The CFI began its analysis by resolving what it treated as a conflict between competition policy and intellectual property rights. The conflict was resolved as followsfirst, the Court simply assumed that Microsoft had patent and trade secret protection
of the protocols and the Directory, despite some hesitation over the strength of the
claims. Second, the Court affirmed the Commission's determination that, under
exceptional circumstances, competition policy can trump patent and trade rights.
The exceptional circumstances turned on the question of access to an indispensable
asset controlled by a dominant firm, here WINDOWS protocols controlled by
Microsoft. The protocols were deemed an essential facility for competition in the
market for server operating system software. The CFI concluded that in the special
circumstances competition policy trumped Microsoft's exclusionary rights in the
absence of objective justification. It followed that the proper remedy was a decree
compelling Microsoft to disclose the information to their competitors.
The effect was a sharp change in the competitive and cooperative relationships between
Microsoft and its rivals. Until the decision, both competition and cooperation were
restrained by Microsoft's asserted property rights to refuse disclosure of interoperability information, an exclusionary right asserted under the aegis of trade secret and patent ownership. As is often the case, competition on the merits was not possible without
some cooperation between participants. The CFI decision applied the competition

90
The case also involved distribution of WINDOWS MEDIA PLAYER. As Professor Steven
Anderman put it, four threads run through the CFI analysis:

' (I) The significance of the findings of "indispensabiliry" of the interface protocols to
interoperabiliry in the "second market." (2) The significance of the finding that there was a
"risk" of elimination of competition in the second market. (3) The "exceptional circumstances" in which competition law will find that a refusal to license an IPR will be an
infringement of Art. 82 [now Article 102 TFEU). (4) The finding of an absence of objective justification.' Anderman, Pro-Consumer Efficiencies in Antitrust Law and Practice
(26 October 2007) LUISS Universiry, Rome.
91
Case T-201104 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 (interoperabiliry protocols for some
front-end server softwase) ('Microsoft'); see also, Lockwood v American Airlines, Inc, 107 F3d 1565 (Fed
Cir 1997).
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policy of the then Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU) to compel Microsoft to
cooperate with rivals in order to allow competition on the merits of the server software
rather than on the advantage derived from Microsoft's ownership ofexclusive access to
an essential component in PC networks comprising numerous components.
So much for EU competition policy and exclusionary rights. In the US, the outcome
would have been in doubt. First, the Supreme Court has in effect gutted essential
facility doctrine as a basis for antitrust liability. Second, turning on its head the EU
view, patent rights trump US antitrust policy. And third, as a general matter, US
courts are indisposed toward granting compulsory licences, seeing them as insults to
the institution of private property. In sum, US antitrust is a weak voice for expressing
competition policy. 92
Now comes the emergent view of the US patent domain as a distinct competition
regime and, in consequence, a more rigorous requirement of description and enablement. How would this play out on the bare-bone facts of the EU Microsoft antitrust
case?93

As already discussed, the current description and enablement requirement for computer software calls only for a general description of the process. And so Microsoft is
not currently required to specify the protocols or the Directory. In shore, the information would likely be secret. But if the requirement were reformulated in consonance with the emergent view, then both the protocols and the Directory would
be disclosed-the protocols as necessary to enable skilled practitioners to use the
software and the Directory as reflecting the protocols' best mode of use. 94
A more demanding description and enablement would have two effects. First, it
would improve the information flow during the patent term, the public knowledge
benefit expected from the prosecution stage's competition in ideas. Second, it would
define more clearly and more narrowly the metes and bounds of the patent monopoly. In relational terms, it would expand the patent holder's obligation to cooperate
with rivals and other interested parties, a third party obligation enforced during the
prosecution stage of the patent life cycle. As a result, it would change the conditions
ofcompetition during the patent term by having given rivals the information needed
92 See, eg, RJR Perirz, 'The Microsoft Chronicles' in L Rubini (ed) Microsoft on Trial: Legal and
Economic Analysis ofa Tramatlantic Antitrust Case (Aldershoc: Edward Elgar Publishing, forrhcoming
2010); Perirz, 'Microsoft e ii flusso di informazioni' (2007) 9 Mercaco, Concorrenza, Regole 523
(Italian translation by Andrea Giannaccari).
93 For an expansive introduction co patent, copyright, trade secret, and trademark as competition
regimes, see Perirz 'Competition Policy and its Implications for Intellectual Property Rights in the
United States' (2006) (n 4 above).
94 For a demanding approach to the description requirement, see 1he Gentry Gallery v 1he Berkline
Corp, 134 F3d 1473 (Fed Cir 1998). For criticism, see Moba v Diamond Automation, Inc, 325 F3d
1300, 1323 (Fed Cir 2003) (Rader, J, dissenting).
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to compete on the merits. In sum, the relational changes would track those of the
CFI decision in the EU Microsoft decision.
Bur the relational changes would not be identical. First, the patent resolution would
require no litigation for disclosure. Second, it would involve no licensing, no judicial
oversight, and thus no licensing fee, no bargaining or other transaction costs. Third,
however, the use value of the information would depend on the scope of experimental use permitted. In the United States, the use under current law is for all practical
purposes forbidden. But with a viable experimental use doctrine properly understood as competition during the patent term, experimentation short of commercial
use would be permitted. Finally, unlike the compulsory licence in the EU case, patent disclosure of the Directory as the best mode of organizing the protocols would
not necessarily permit its commercial use. Certainly second comers could use the
protocols commercially because they lack invention; but if the Directory is a nonobvious invention, patent rights would block its commercial use. Here, the patent
regime's compelled cooperation between Microsoft and its rivals should not include
commercial use of the Directory, if determined a non-obvious invention, because
commercial competition on the merits is possible without access. Indeed competition in the development of more efficient or otherwise superior protocol organization in other directories holds the promise of technological progress.
This final example has shown how the patent regime can be understood as an instrument of economic progress that shapes relationships of competition and cooperation. The analysis begins with the presumption that free competition promotes
economic progress. Any policy or adjudication that would expand the scale or scope
of patent rights requires evidence of its progressive value. What justifies this shift
from the current patent regime's presumption that exclusionary rights promote
progress? It begins with recognition of a policy stalemate that derives from the indeterminacy of incentive theory as the basis for preferring either patent protection or
free competition as the superior engine of progress. This stalemate is broken by free
competition's superior distributional effects, superior because competition generates
more allocatively efficient outcomes and, with them, conditions more conducive to
future inventive activity. At the same time, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
reflects an emergent strain of patent doctrine that recognizes an internal competition
policy-what an earlier decision by a unanimous Court called 'a baseline of free
competition'. More broadly, adopting a baseline of competition would change the
current US view of IP and antitrust as antithetical regimes, as a binary opposition
between monopoly and competition, between exclusion and access. What would
emerge is a more progressive and more functional view of IP and antitrust as two
intertwined regimes comprising policies of both exclusion and access, two sets of
rules and policies that set the conditions for relationships of competition and cooperation to promote the progress of knowledge and industrial technology.
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Conclusion
This chapter has sketched the orthodox view of the patent regime as founded on
exclusionary rights to promote progress, its jurisprudence, and its dependence on a
failed incentive theory, as well as an emergent view expressed in the jurisprudence
and in a residual economics that converge to support the reconceptualization of
patent protection as a competition regime. The emergent jurisprudence echoes an
opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor written some 20 years ago for a unanimous Supreme Court, an opinion that described the foundation of patent policy as
a 'baseline of free competition'.
While the chapter adopts the baseline of free competition, it otherwise diverges from
Justice O'Connor's opinion insofar as the chapter's ensuing analysis reflects the failure of incentive theory as the economic logic for patent protection, a failure that is
not acknowledged in the opinion or in today's mainstream jurisprudence. Still there
is a residual economic logic that is surprisingly straightforward despite its absence in
the mainstream literature: while the dynamic efficiency effects of both free competi- .
tion and patent rights are indeterminate, their distributional effects point toward
free competition. Why? Because patents that actually have economic value produce
monopoly prices and, with them, welfare losses in both static and dynamic terms. In
consequence not only consumers but subsequent inventors are better off under a
regime offree competition because it gives inventors open access to new information.
The result is improved conditions for subsequent invention. In this light, a rule or
policy that would strengthen patent rights should first be shown to promote greater
progress than would otherwise occur. Yet patent protection can serve the public
interest as a sharp instrument for targeted industrial policy though it fails as a magic
potion for promoting economic progress. But even with patents as sharp tools of
industrial policy, risks of failure and unintended consequences call for careful analysis to overcome the presumption that free competition better serves the public
interest.
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The longest series of studies developed interview data from senior executives in the
research and development departments of commercial firms. Five studies between
1959 and 2001 all reached the same conclusion: The prospect of patent protection
was typically a factor of third or fourth order importance to research and development decisions, with the exception of the drug industry and perhaps chemicals.
Still, it must be understood that these studies investigated only the private value of
patents; neither public benefits nor public costs were addressed.
Other recent studies have inquired into the public benefits by looking at the relationship between changes in patent protection and changes in research and development
expenditures. Japanese and US studies found the data inconclusive. One study across
29 countries found a mild positive correlation and another across 60 countries found
a weak negative one. Moreover, the findings have been mixed in studies of statistical
correlation between patent protection and the ultimate economic goal of increasing
growth.
A rare statistical study of copyright protection has just been published. Relying on
data from 1870 to 2006, the authors conclude, 'Despite the logic of the theory that
increasing copyright protection will increase the number of copyrighted works, the
data do not support it.' 18

In sum, the empirical literature on the public benefits of patent and copyright is at
best inconclusive. 19 This brings us full circle back to the theoretical impasse that
preceded it. Small wonder, then, that so many policy makers in the United States
have taken the fall-back position, the mistaken focus on the means itself-on maximizing IP protection in the erroneous belief that progress will be maximized as a
natural result.

18 RSR Ku, J Sun, Y Fan, 'Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of
Copyright's Bounty' (2009) 62 Vanderbilt L Rev 1669.
19 Regardless of findings, all the empirical work confronts methodological difficulties. Here are
two. First, the variables used are controversial. The uses of patent counts, citations, or renewal rates as
measures of technological progress have all been criticized, as has the use of research and development
expenditure data. Simply counting patents, or copyright registrations for that matter, does not take
into account differences in their importance and social value. And more R&D spending does not
necessary lead to more or better inventions.
There is a second methodological difficulty- the intractable problem of disentangling patent or
R&D data from other sources of economic growth, sources including trade secrets, improved technical education, or increased production, to name a few. A noted American legal scholar put the general
methodological problem this way, 'Ifa state ofaffairs is the product of n variables, and you have knowledge of or control over less than n variables, if you think you know what's going to happen when you
vary "your" variables, you're a booby.' A Leff, 'Economic Analysis of Law' (1974) 60 Virginia L Rev
451 (comparing the first edition of Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law to Cervantes' Don
Quixote). 'Booby' denotes a stupid person.
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